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Abstract 
 
Academics, policy-makers and consultants have been increasingly focusing upon the 'region' as the crucible of economic 
development. This regionalist approach places institutions at the centre of the process of stimulating growth. Much debate 
has been ongoing in academic circles, particularly those inhabited by economic geographers, about the veracity of the 
regionalist approach and the explanatory power of the terminology associated with it. This paper analyses explicit efforts to 
engender regional economic development in the West Coast of South Africa. Our empirical evaluation indicates that policy 
actors have sought to upgrade the institutional infrastructure of the region and that some significant achievements are 
evident within this realm. However, these achievements are yet to be associated with sustained regional economic takeoff. 
The paper concludes by asking searching questions about the ability of the regionalist approach to deliver meaningful socio-
economic transformation. 
 
Introduction 
 
Arguably, the toughest challenge faced by South Africa’s post-1994 Government has been to confront the deeply rooted 
racial and spatial inequalities inherited from apartheid. The Government’s response has been to adopt a neoliberal macro-
economic framework in the expectation that a stable economic environment will generate investment, economic growth and 
widespread job creation. Neoliberal doctrine found expression in the formulation of a regional development programme that 
was announced in 1995, whereby a number of specified localities with ‘untapped economic potential’ became the focus of 
endeavours to engage with global flows of trade and investment (Crush & Rogerson 2001; Jourdan 1998; Jourdan et al. 
1997). Between 1997 and 2001 the government invested considerable financial and human resources in these regions, 
known as spatial development initiatives (SDIs), but the programme has not been particularly successful in meeting its key 
objective of attracting significant flows of investment (Bek 2003; Crush & Rogerson 2001). One SDI, the West Coast 
Investment Initiative (WCII), in Western Cape Province has achieved more success than most other SDIs, although 
domestic public and private sector investment was significantly greater than inward foreign investment (Budlender & 
Shapiro 2001). However, a core component of the WCII strategy was to lay the pre-conditions for future growth by 
developing the institutional structure of the  region, building a ‘regional growth coalition’ and achieving ‘dividends on the 
process side’. Initial investigations in the region certainly suggested that considerable progress has been made in upgrading 
the region’s institutional resources (Budlender & Shapiro 2001). The primary objective of the paper is to consider the extent 
to which ‘dividends on the process side’ have actually become embedded within the operational practice of public, private, 
voluntary and community bodies operating at different spatial scales. Such ‘dividends’ are placed into a broader context, by 
problematising the relationship between regional economic growth and socioeconomic transformation – a relationship, it is 
argued, that tends to be given too little critical consideration by proponents of contemporary regional development 
programmes.  
 
 
Exploring ‘new regionalism’ in South Africa  
 
This paper will contribute to an understanding of the realities of explicit policy endeavours to facilitate an environment 
conducive for economic growth. In terms of theory, this work builds upon contemporary canons of ‘new economic 
geography’, which have focused upon the role of cultural phenomena in generating regional economic growth (Bryson et al. 
1999). Terms such as ‘institutional thickness’, ‘untraded interdependencies’, and ‘neo-Marshallian nodes’ have been 
associated with this intellectual approach, which has been gaining considerable recognition in both academic and policy 
circles (Amin 1999; Henry & Pinch 2001). The paper makes a contribution to these literatures through its explicit focus upon 
a region in a developing nation, a hitherto largely neglected spatial focus for new economic geography theorising. At the 
same time, the paper contributes to the burgeoning South African local economic development literature, of which 
evaluations of the SDI programme form a component. Initial research outputs exploring the implementation of SDI focused 
heavily upon investment outcomes and the political implications of the cross-border SDIs in Southern Africa (Rogerson 
2002; Taylor 2001). This paper can be read alongside the works of Kepe (2001) and Rogerson (2004) who have examined 
localised institutional aspects of SDIs in the Wild Coast and Gauteng respectively. The pre-existence of a strategy to foster 
an enhanced institutional environment for economic activity defines the distinctiveness of this paper in the context of the 
local economic development (LED) literature (Binns & Nel 2002).  
Lovering (1999) refers to an intellectual phenomenon that he terms the ‘New Regionalism’, whereby academics, policy-
makers and consultants are increasingly focusing upon the region as ‘the crucible’ of economic development. Such an 
approach has in part evolved from Porter (1990) and Ohmae’s (1993) influential accounts of the centrality of the region to 
processes of growth and regeneration. The new institutionalist paradigm of regional development is a significant sub-strand 
of the new regionalism (Lovering 1999). This influential, if somewhat contested, approach (see Lovering 1999; Markusen 
2003) ‘reflects [upon] the relationship between economy and culture and the embeddedness of economic activity within 
social and political forms, practices and institutions’, (Wood & Valler 2001, p. 1139). In this regard, the whole notion of 
institutional thickness as a facilitator of growth has gained currency. A range of regionally centred institutional constituents 
comprise the concept of institutional thickness, ‘ranging from strong local institutional presence to the strength of shared 
rules, conventions and knowledge’ (Amin & Thrift 1994). Some scholars have pointed to the central importance of multiple 
layers of institutional and associational activity, sometimes referred to as ‘untraded interdependencies’: ‘assets which are 
not tradable, nor are they easily substitutable, since they draw on the social properties of networks in which the economic 
actors are implicated’ (Amin 1999, p. 369).  
 
Such ideas, which have diffused across the globe and among policy-makers in a diverse range of socio-economic contexts, 
draw from the lexicon of the ‘New Regionalism’. As Lovering (1999, p. 380) argues, ‘The primary task now is to “embed” 
existing and future inward investments. This, together with more “networking” and the development of “trust”, will encourage 
and diffuse a general boost in innovation and further impact in the regional “business culture” and the associated “mindset”.’ 
Thus, the more well established the institutional networks, the more likely it is that an area will have theinherent potential to 
adapt and respond to economic change successfully. According to Cabus (2001, p. 1018), ‘successful regions are precisely 
those in which there is a mature network culture with networks between firms and public or semi-public agencies 
responsible for economic development’. In this context, institutions comprise firms, trade associations, marketing boards, 
government agencies and so forth. Over time, a positive ‘social atmosphere’ favouring cooperation and common enterprise 
will emerge and ‘rogue behaviour’ and rent seeking will be inhibited (Henry & Pinch 2001). In addition to these ideas, other 
authors, particularly those with an interest in Third World development, have identified the critical importance of both human 
and social capital. Major development agencies such as the World Bank, DfID and USAID now routinely incorporate human 
and social capital building objectives into their strategies. The rapid rise of social and human capital as ‘missing links’ in 
economic development has been subjected to critique, not least due to the slippery nature of their conceptual underpinnings 
and their definitional malleability in the hands of different interest groups (Bebbington 2004; Fine 1999; Schuurman 2003). It 
is clear, however, that a focus on cultural and social influences on growth and stagnation is a welcome step forward, 
although one that should be approached with critical intellectual rigour.  
 
This paper draws upon both ‘new economic geography’ and development literatures, in order to evaluate the processes 
associated with policy efforts to stimulate economic growth in a region of South Africa. Such a line of enquiry is justified in 
this case since local policy-makers and planners have explicitly referred to the importance of institutional development as a 
prerequisite for growth in the region under discussion. Furthermore, the paper furthers ongoing debates within geographical 
literature, specifically the matter of a putative disciplinary divide that operates both theoretically and all too often in terms of 
the ‘culture’ of geography departments (Jones 2000; Potter 2001; Robinson 2002). This relates specifically to the divide 
between ‘development’ work and that related to Western market economies. While matters of history, social culture and 
economic culture are as relevant in understanding the South African West Coast economy as they are in the Third Italy, or 
Motor Sport Valley (Amin 1999; Henry & Pinch 2001) there is comparatively little written by economic geographers, whose 
output relates almost exclusively to Western Europe, North America and the occasional newly industrialised country. A 
notable exception is Storper’s work on Brazil (Storper 1990), otherwise there is lamentably little cross fertilisation between 
contemporary economic geography and theories pertaining to the developing world. Such a discrete division of labour within 
the academy is problematic. Certain types of global interconnectedness are advancing apace, and the neoliberal paradigm 
in its various mutations strides the globe disseminating ‘one size fits all’ policy prescriptions, often propagated by 
international consultancy firms.  
 
Such realities place an onus upon academics to problematise such ongoing development processes. It is clear that there is 
a necessity for the language, concepts and methods of the new economic geography to be applied in the context of 
emerging regions within the developing world. This paper touches on such matters, through reference to soft infrastructural 
developments, institutional learning, mindset changing and labour supply issues in the context of an emerging region within 
South Africa.  
 
The paper provides an empirically-based exploration of policy endeavours to facilitate institutional development within the 
West Coast region of South Africa. Such policy endeavours have occurred under the aegis of the South African 
Government’s flagship industrialisation programme, the spatial development initiatives (SDIs). The paper does not seek to 
provide an evaluation of SDI per se, but instead examines one aspect of the programme’s delivery within the West Coast 
region. Indeed, it should be stressed that the institutional emphasis within the West Coast SDI was largely a local 
interpretation of the SDI methodology. The paper outlines ways in which the SDI planners endeavoured to upgrade the 
institutional status of the West Coast region during the two distinct phases of SDI activity. The concluding section considers 
the validity of claims by SDI planners that dividends have been achieved on ‘the process side’, and questions the ability of 
the regionalist paradigm to deliver the kinds of socio-economic dividends that South Africa so desperately needs. 
 
The SDI Programme 
 
South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) Government came to power in 1994 with its reconstruction and 
development programme (RDP), emphasising poverty alleviation and job creation, together with grassroots participation in 
the development process and empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups. But, when faced with harsh economic 
realities, the ANC policy direction changed dramatically with the launch of the neoliberal growth, employment and 
redistribution (GEAR) programme in 1996, with its strong focus on export production and increased involvement of the 
private sector. The SDIs launched in 1995, became a showpiece of the GEAR macro-economic strategy, placing emphasis 
on the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade generation in selected regions.  
 
In launching the SDI strategy, the South African Government stated that human and financial resources were to be focused 
on regions with the potential to connect with global markets through the development of strategic corridors and clusters ( 
Jourdan 1998; Jourdan et al. 1997). Once these areas had become selfsustaining, attention would then be redirected 
towards less well-endowed areas (DTI 1998, 2000). The SDI programme has been administered at the national level by the 
Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) ‘Special Projects Directorate’, the Department of Transport and the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). SDI’s status as a supporting pillar of GEAR reflects the South African Government’s faith 
in the neoliberal ideology, and as such can be ‘understood as an element in South African responses to globalisation and 
represents a further variant of essentially “top-down” spatial planning’ (Rogerson 2002, p. 38). The SDI formula focused 
upon the stimulation of inward investment in economic sectors with the potential to earn foreign exchange through exports, 
thus generating economic growth, which, via ‘trickle down’, would stimulate development – in theory, at least (Söderbaum & 
Taylor 2001).  
 
SDIs have also been conceptualised as short-term, fast track interventions acting as catalysts for long-term growth (Jourdan 
1998; Platzky 1998). During the initial 3 to 4 year period of national leadership when an SDI is initiated, a designated project 
manager works with a small team of staff and consultants in identifying potential projects, seeking investors and facilitating 
the development of key organisations and institutions on the ground. After this period of time, it is intended that provincial 
and local government should carry on the work following the implementation of a transitional exit/integration strategy. In this 
way, an SDI would engender capacity building at a local government level and also facilitate the developmental role of this 
sphere, since local officials would carry on the delivery of SDI initiated projects and processes.  
 
 
The West Coast Investment Initiative (WCII) [1] 
 
SDI regions were deemed to possess the potential to fulfil the core objectives of South African industrial policy, which 
included enhancing investment and exports, particularly in the industrial, tourism and agri-processing sectors. In order to 
facilitate trade, the majority of SDIs formed coastal development corridors including port facilities and/or incorporate 
neighbouring countries. One such SDI is the West Coast Investment Initiative (WCII), located on South Africa’s Atlantic 
Coast (see Figure 1), and covering an area of 30,000 hectares, with a population of 300,000. The area’s economy is 
dominated by agricultural production and processing, fishing and fish processing, manufacturing and mineral processing 
(WCII 1997; Wesgro 2000). At the time of WCII’s designation, plans were underway to build a US$800 million steel mill at 
Saldanha, using iron ore brought along an 861km dedicated mineral line from Sishen in Northern Cape Province (Fitschen 
1998). This plant, jointly funded by the national iron and steel company, Iscor and the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC), was initially perceived as the catalyst for the generation of a significant cluster of industrial activity in the region. Part 
of WCII’s remit was to facilitate the process of attracting complementary downstream steel-processing businesses into the 
region. Thus, the West Coast offered clear potential as a mixed industrial/agri-tourism SDI, and the diversity of economic 
opportunities available in the region was reflected in the WCII Appraisal Document (1997) prepared for an investor oriented 
conference in 1998. The region is recognised as being somewhat conservative in outlook politically, and is dominated by 
Afrikaans-speaking White and Coloured communities, with Africans representing only 4 per cent of the population before the 
establishment of WCII.  
 
The initial designation of the WCII was a somewhat controversial affair and reflects the institutional contradictions that 
created a problematic context for regional development in post-apartheid South Africa. The peculiar political makeup of the 
Western Cape provincial and local government had various impacts upon the SDI process. While the prestigious nature of 
the SDI programme led to competition between regions to secure an SDI, the situation in Western Cape was complicated by 
political factors (Budlender & Shapiro 2001). The autonomy of provincial governments had been a sensitive issue since the 
creation of the new provinces in 1994, and the imposition of SDI from above exacerbated pre-existing tensions. The 
Democratic Party, the dominant force in the Western Cape legislature at the time, objected to the centralised control system 
inherent in SDI, which seemingly bypassed provincial and local structures. In particular, there was resistance to the 
appointment of the national SDI director, because he was identified as being ‘too close’ to the ANC (Bek & Taylor 2001). 
IDC documents indicate that the original working title for the project was the ‘Saldanha SDI’ (IDC 1997), but the title ‘West 
Coast Investment Initiative’ ultimately emerged as a compromise, suggesting a certain ambiguity about the precise locus of 
power within the delivery of the SDI. Ironically, there was resistance to the designation of an SDI within the Western Cape 
from certain national politicians and other provinces, who believed that the Western Cape was already relatively advantaged 
and had less need for the added stimulus of an SDI than other localities. Such arguments may have a basis in egalitarian 
thinking, but were perhaps more motivated by political desires to keep the non-ANC run Western Cape in its place. At the 
local level, there existed very strong support for the SDI initiative, despite the depth of anti-ANC feeling then prevailing 
within the West Coast. As will be shown later, political sensitivities operating at a range of scales significantly complicated 
the regional development process. However, programmes such as SDI have acted as media through which more 
constructive political relations can be established, albeit following periods of confrontation and non-co-operation.  
 
 
 
 
Focusing on the ‘process side’  
 
At the initiation of the SDI process, it was believed that constraints on rapid economic development existed on the West 
Coast. According to a series of confidential interviews which were undertaken with key informants in the region, these took 
the form of a general lack of entrepreneurial culture within the non-White component of the West Coast population, and the 
lack of an effective growth coalition among local institutions to facilitate development. The West Coast region has been 
typified variously as ‘parochial’, ‘complacent’, ‘insular’, ‘local elite dominated’, ‘anti-investment’ and suffering from a ‘small 
town mentality’. Narrow perspectives built upon a history of physical isolation and an economy of ‘fish, flowers and farms’ 
prevent locals from tapping into new opportunities such as cultural tourism. A number of respondents referred to a lack of 
entrepreneurial dynamics among the Black community, with some people citing the existence of ‘cultures of entitlement’; 
while others believed that the seasonality of the fishing industry produced a ‘live for today’ approach to life. Other informants 
reflected upon the long-term effects of South Africa’s apartheid history, which has created a society in which Black people 
constructed a negative self-image, whereby they were destined to be labourers rather than entrepreneurs. It is certainly the 
case that opportunities for Black people were severely restricted during the apartheid era, and as a result basic business 
knowledge and skills are severely lacking within Black communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
The area’s economy has been dominated by small groups of (usually) White business people, who have exercised a 
stranglehold on business development and have tended to influence local policy making. Innovation and competition have 
tended to be discouraged, and at the time WCII was conceived, it was evident that institutional capacity within the West 
Coast was limited. A variety of institutional constraints existed within the West Coast, including the impacts of long-standing 
political enmities that prevented effective co-ordination between policy delivery and development. In addition, the lack of an 
effective growth coalition between local public and private sector organisations needed to be rectified. In sum, there was an 
absence of the key indicators that comprise a positive institutional environment, namely: the existence of dominant ‘rogue 
behaviour’, a lack of trust and reciprocity, an absence of a sense of ‘common project’ and a narrow range of institutional 
actors (Henry & Pinch 2001). Overcoming such a range of constraints was to be a significant challenge for WCII planners.  
 
In February 1998, a major Investors’ conference was held in Saldanha, to present the 120 projects that had been identified. 
The event was attended by more than 500 people, including National Finance Minister Trevor Manuel and President Nelson 
Mandela, who later gave the keynote address, in which he stated, ‘the spatial initiatives are stations for boarding the 
Development Train – now is the time to catch it!’ (Bek et al. 2004; Waddell 1998). Success in attracting significant inflows of 
investment (see Box 1) was limited for a number of reasons, including the impact of the ongoing South East Asian financial 
crisis, which rendered investors wary of emerging markets. Following the 1998 conference, planners switched the emphasis 
towards smaller scale and locally-based ‘achievable’ projects. At this point, the WCII ‘exit strategy’ was implemented, with 
the intention of creating the necessary preconditions for the integration of WCII economic development activities into local 
and provincial departments. Exit strategy projects were qualitatively different in emphasis to the investors’ conference 
phase, as they were predicated upon a more bottom-up approach to the stimulus of economic development. Thus, 
community involvement and the input of catalytic state funds featured more predominantly than in the investors’ conference 
phase. The impact of demonstration effects within communities, the public sector and the private sector, were seen as 
paramount.  
 
It was felt that people’s eyes needed to be opened to the ‘bigger picture’ – in other words since the demise of apartheid and 
its associated isolation, the West Coast was now free to tap into significant international opportunities by developing its 
inherent resources. Mindset changing within the institutions of the West Coast was integral to the process from the very 
inception of WCII. One former WCII employee commented, ‘there have been serious dividends on the process side’. 
Informants regularly referred to the catalytic benefits of the WCII process, which resulted in ‘mindset’ and ‘paradigm’ shifts 
among the general populace and institutional actors of the West Coast. Local people were encouraged to realise that 
development was in their own hands and that progress could only be achieved through co-operation and trust. The intention 
was to bring together local people from different backgrounds (public sector, old and new private sector, Black, White, 
Coloured, male and female) and negotiate progressive strategies.  
 
 
Building institutional and employment capacity on the West Coast  
 
The WCII strategy was primarily geared towards generating economic activity in the West Coast region, through the 
establishment of a number of fora and working groups, and by facilitating increased networking between different agencies 
and institutions. Capacity constraints at the institutional level have posed significant challenges to economic progress in the 
region. A significant and successful local body established under the aegis of WCII was the Local Economic Development 
(LED) Forum, which brought together local role players to plan development strategies. WCII supported such developments 
through rhetoric, finance and human resources. Individual WCII employees were instrumental in driving the LED Forum 
during the WCII exit phase.  
 
WCII’s facilitative role was pivotal in the creation of these initiatives and institutions. The ability of a single agency to take a 
regional perspective and pull together key actors in a non-politicised manner was seen as essential to the success of such 
programmes. The establishment of nine sectoral working groups, which identified potential economic projects for the 
investors’ conference, was perceived as something of a masterstroke in terms of pulling diverse actors together. Some 
observers felt that the existence of WCII also intensified the growth coalition that had existed prior to 1997 (Budlender & 
Shapiro 2001). On the negative side, the relationship between WCII and the provincial investment agency Wesgro was not 
always constructive. The project manager perceived that a difference in approach to investment, proactive on the part of 
WCII, reactive on the part of Wesgro, was the main source of conflict (Budlender & Shapiro 2001).  
 
WCII was also actively involved in lobbying for improvements to the educational and training infrastructure available to the 
West Coast population. The project manager realised that industrial location decisions made by investors would be partly 
governed by the availability of a suitable labour force. Key priorities, therefore, were the establishment of an education, 
training and employment (ETE) working group, a local skills audit, and much lobbying was undertaken in favour of 
upgrading the West Coast educational infrastructure. According to Budlender & Shapiro (2001, p. 16), ‘if the WCII had not 
focused seriously on skills, it would have amounted to attracting investment under false pretences and without giving them 
the real picture’. However, there was resistance from the national Department of Trade and Industry, which did not 
appreciate that the development of social infrastructure and human resources was part of the SDI remit (Budlender & 
Shapiro 2001). It seems extraordinary that a major national investment programme had been launched without due 
consideration being given to all necessary prerequisites when preparing the regions for investment flows (see Rogerson 
2004) for a discussion of similar issues in the context of the Province-driven SDI in Gauteng).  
 
The creation of business development centres is a crucial step in facilitating small business growth in a region. WCII 
established the West Coast Business Development Centre (WCBDC) in Saldanha during February 1998, since then it has 
gained a strong reputation throughout South Africa. The Centre has acted as a crucial nexus between the corporate 
organisations of Saldanha Bay’s industrial and fish processing clusters and the embryonic small and microenterprise (SME) 
sectors. Representatives from successful local SMEs, particularly so-called Black economic empowerment (BEE) 
enterprises, have consistently stressed the importance of the WCBDC in facilitating access to relevant training, finance, 
tenders and business advice. Major sources of initial funding included the state funded body Ntsika, WCII, DTI and the West 
Coast Peninsula Transitional Council. As the Centre has become established, so new funding sources have been identified 
such as the NGO Nation’s Trust and Standard Bank. In addition, significant contributions have been received from the 
Saldanha Port Authority and local corporations. WCBDC has a broad remit, offering a range of services to local business, 
while also ‘thickening’ local and provincial networks.  
 
The efforts of WCII were constrained by various party political conflicts that were exposed by the SDI framework. Working 
through these constraints, and forcing individuals and political parties to confront the broader needs of the region, was an 
integral element of the SDI process in the West Coast. Tensions surfaced between the WCII technical team and certain 
individuals in provincial government, largely due to the political polarisation in the West Coast. At one end of the spectrum 
was the largely Afrikaans-speaking, mostly White, entrenched power bloc of landowners and farmers, whose political 
sympathies lay within the National Party (NP), or even further to the right. At the other end of the spectrum, was the much 
more populous Coloured community, the majority of whom eke out a living as labourers. Some of those in powerful 
positions undoubtedly perceived the SDI’s aim of changing the ownership base of the region’s economy as a threat to their 
interests. National–provincial tensions also affected the local SDI process, with claims that some of the provincial 
departments did not really know what was going on. Such tensions were observable at a local level between the NP and the 
ANC in the Western Cape, with suggestions that provincial NP leaders tried to block the progress of WCII through various 
obstructive acts. For example, threats were made to withdraw from consultation processes, and vigorous complaints were 
lodged about the perceived political allegiances of WCII working group members.  
 
Political power struggles undoubtedly caused much stress for those endeavouring to deliver the Western Cape SDI 
programme, and indeed the process was very nearly derailed. However, the process of working through these tensions, 
which were inevitable in the aftermath of apartheid, and bringing antagonistic parties to the table, was crucial in re-
configuring the Western Cape’s institutional environment. WCII acted as a crucial conduit through which tensions could be 
negotiated and some form of positive compromise reached, thus paving the way for more constructive relations in the 
future.  
 
While the SDI programme has undoubtedly promoted increased interaction between local, provincial and national levels of 
government, policy strategies emanating from one department have, at times, been undermined by weaknesses and 
inconsistencies that existed within supposedly complementary areas of government. For example, the construction of a fish 
market in the coastal village of Paternoster was funded through the Local Economic Development Fund and the Poverty 
Relief Fund and supported by the local Saldanha Bay municipality. Yet the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
subsequently refused to award fishing quotas to fisher folk in the village, so the fish market is severely underused. Policy 
inconsistencies and power struggles between different spheres of government have also been perceived as stumbling 
blocks hindering the progress of the Gauteng SDI (Rogerson 2004).  
 
In the contemporary policy environment that favours public–-private partnerships, it is imperative that government officials, 
and indeed would-be entrepreneurs, gain experience ofthe ‘mores’ and ‘rules of engagement’ of the private sector. IDC 
representatives noted that a significant dividend from the SDI programme had been the bringing together of public and 
private sectors, a point that was corroborated by actors on the West Coast. The WCII programme produced opportunities 
for exposure to the private sector, thus easing local and provincial officials through the learning curve. Importantly, planners 
are becoming increasingly aware of the centrality of market-led demand to the potential success of any business project. In 
the initial phase of WCII, there tended to be a naïve assumption that the ability to supply a product or service would be 
sufficient to generate a market.  
 
The integration phase of WCII technically came to an end during 2000. By this time, the delivery of economic projects was 
being coordinated from the Provincial Department of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Tourism where the project manager 
had taken up a senior post. Local government and a series of other state, non-governmental, private sector and community 
agencies were involved in planning and delivering various economic-based projects within the West Coast region. During 
2000 and 2001 there were many claims that the local SDI process had been ‘catalytic’, and had thickened local institutional 
networks in ways that would facilitate the further growth and development of the region.  
 
As WCII scaled down its formal involvement within the West Coast, so the onus fell increasingly upon local actors to provide 
the momentum for sustaining various bodies. In the case of the LED Forum, problems set in soon after the leadership of a 
WCII fieldworker was lost, and the forum faded away. The success of WCII’s small team of fieldworkers led local councillors 
to the realisation that it would be appropriate to appoint an officer to manage and direct economic activity. However, local 
councils underwent a massive spatial and structural reorganisation following the elections in December 2000, and the 
changes in personnel and their responsibilities led to a slow down in decision-making concerning issues such as LED. Local 
councils had been handed a mandate to take charge of LED, and each council was required to produce an integrated 
development plan indicating how LED was to be delivered.  
 
In some councils, significant changes in personnel occurred, as obstructive members of the ‘old guard’ were sidelined or 
retired. However, such individuals often had most knowledge of the SDI process. Indeed, it has been reported that some 
individuals had subtly manipulated the access of colleagues to WCII structures and information, in order to consolidate their 
own control over the process. The net outcome was to reduce the level of beneficial social capital existing within such 
municipalities in the aftermath of WCII’s integration. One local planner later observed that the withdrawal of direct input from 
WCII had ‘incapacitated the municipality and created an institutional vacuum’, as few sustainable structures remained that 
would survive the process of municipal transition.  
 
By 2003, the newly established Saldanha Bay municipality had completed its internal reorganisation process and the 
concept of a major industrial zone for the Saldanha Bay area reemerged in municipality plans. While a series of schemes 
had been touted in past decades, each had been stymied by a combination of infrastructural and institutional constraints. 
Thus, the region currently possesses a vastly under-utilised port facility and a small cluster of heavy industry based around 
Saldanha Steel. Efforts to facilitate local downstreaming activity and multipliers have been limited, and the modern steel 
plant therefore operates with only loose economic connections to the locality (Fitschen 1998). In the late 1990s an industrial 
development zone (IDZ) had been planned as part of the SDI programme. However, this process was stalled when national 
government gave priority to an IDZ development at Coega, near Port Elizabeth, in the ANC stronghold of the Eastern Cape. 
The Western Cape provincial government was keen to learn from the Coega experience before proceeding with establishing 
structures necessary to drive an IDZ at Saldanha Bay. Significant shifts in global geopolitics are seen as favouring Saldanha 
Bay, notably the desire of the US Government to reduce dependency on Middle Eastern energy resources has stimulated 
considerable interest in oil and gas reserves known to exist off the western coast of Africa (Stanford et al. 2004). The port at 
Saldanha has the potential to act as the major oil industry servicing site for the entire western African coast. Furthermore, 
the decision by the National Party to form an alliance with the ANC has significantly altered the political landscape of the 
Western Cape. In the April 2004 elections the ANC gained control of the province, and as a result has cast a more 
benevolent eye towards the resource needs of the province. The ANC victory was welcomed with a sense of relief among 
many pro-investment entrepreneurs in the West Coast, even those whose historical allegiances lay elsewhere.  
 
In a relatively short period of time, these major shifts in geopolitics and national policy have radically altered the context 
within which the West Coast regional economy now operates. During 2003 the Saldanha Bay municipality took a number of 
steps to put institutional structures in place that would facilitate investment. These included drawing upon the expertise of 
the provincial investment agency, Wesgro, and a firm of private consultants, to undertake both a SWOT analysis of the local 
economic infrastructure and a wide-ranging consultation exercise with local interest groups, including private and 
community bodies (Saldanha Bay Municipality 2003). Local pro-investment groups have developed in the Saldanha Bay 
region, such as the Saldanha Bay Economic Development Corporation, which formed as an offshoot of the Chamber of 
Commerce (Clemitson 2004). The IDC and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) have indicated their 
willingness to commit significant funding to the establishment of a ‘one stop shop’ development agency in the region headed 
by an individual charged to promote the interests of the region.  
 
Moves to generate significant industrial investment in the region are gaining momentum. The establishment of a 
development agency, aligned to growing international recognition of the region’s potential, is the strongest indication that 
economic take-off is a genuine possibility. A growth coalition appears to be forming in the region between state and private 
sector actors. The legacy of WCII seems important here, not so much in terms of institutional structures that were 
established, but more in terms of instituting a process of putting the region ‘on the map’, opening the eyes of entrepreneurs 
and state bodies to the region’s economic potential and bringing various actors together into loose networks. The 
constraints faced by WCII have acted as important lessons for current institutional actors.  
 
However, various significant constraints that undermined WCII’s endeavours remain in place. One major challenge 
confronting the municipality is to find ways of overcoming the short-term interests of landowners, in order to unlock the 
development potential of the area. Fragmented patterns of land ownership within the area designated for industrial 
development are presently acting as a significant constraint upon development. When development plans were touted in the 
past, speculators and governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, such as the South African Ports Authority and Iscor, 
bought many parcels of land. Anecdotal evidence suggests that significant investment opportunities have been lost in recent 
years as overseas investors have been unable to negotiate access to key tracts of land. In addition, attention needs to be 
paid to upgrading the physical and social infrastructure of the region in order to create an environment conducive to 
investment. For example, there is a significant shortage of trained engineers. Overall, however, it is clear that the region is 
undergoing a faltering, yet generally upward, trajectory of increased institutional activity in terms of creating an environment 
conducive for major industrial investment.  
Community-based development 
 
Endeavours to facilitate major industrial development in the Saldanha Bay area have been based around generating 
institutional links between public and private sector agencies. Other economic endeavours, some of which were identified as 
part of the WCII exit strategy, have been ongoing and involve a broad range of actors. Projects involving tourism, 
mariculture and agriculture are now functioning within the West Coast region. A number of these have received varying 
degrees of financial and human resource support from the state, while others have received cash inputs and benefits in 
kind, such as training and mentorship, from NGOs. All the projects contain a BEE focus, particularly in terms of involving 
previously disadvantaged communities. Many observers believe that the key to initiating socio-economic upliftment within 
South Africa lies in finding ways to facilitate economic activity at a local level. Experiences in this regard have been mixed 
within the West Coast and economic outcomes from these projects have been variable. Some initiatives, such as Madiza 
mussel producers in Saldanha Bay and the Rooibos (red bush) Tea Project in Wupperthal are meeting their growing market 
needs via effective business models, and the individuals and communities involved are beginning to see significant benefits. 
A series of fishing-related projects, initiated by women’s groups, have also been gaining momentum (Yeld 2003). But other 
projects are struggling to generate the level of expected business, such as the Paternoster fish market, where despite large 
injections of state funds, it has proven a real struggle to facilitate community engagement. Whatever the economic 
outcomes, the processes involved in bringing these projects to fruition are very important at this stage of the regional 
economic trajectory. Importantly, demonstration effects have been evident in leading to the development of other projects. 
The initiatives labelled as economic ‘failures’ also offer important lessons, indeed learning not to fear failure is seen by some 
advisors as a key process in itself. The experience gained by individuals and organisations is considered as part of a long-
term process of developing capacity within the region to initiate successful economic projects. Evidence suggests that the 
local authority has gained useful experience in working with communities, provincial government and the private sector. 
‘Mindset shifting’ was a core element of the project for all parties, while party political tensions were eased through a 
process of constructive engagement. Importantly, the rather ‘narrow’ networks facilitated through WCII, which somewhat 
controversially tended to bypass community and NGO bodies, are now being extended. In particular, a range of provincial 
and national NGOs have been brought on board to provide expertise and funding. Various West Coast and provincial 
bodies are learning the limits of their powers and expertise, and are also learning what to expect from other institutional 
actors. Capacity building is undoubtedly being developed within the region.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the SDI process on the West Coast brought a number of advantages to the region in terms of helping to 
upgrade the local institutional infrastructure. Networks of diverse actors have been drawn together and the density of multi-
scalar institutional activities has increased substantially. Importantly, the SDI process has acted as a key conduit for working 
through the tensions emanating from the nation’s divided political history.  
 
While some tensions still prevail, there are signs that more progressive actors are starting to control developmental 
processes in the region. Awareness of the region’s economic potential has been increased and the resolve of dynamic, 
outward looking private sector actors has been hardened. While claims that the local institutional setting has improved 
substantially in recent years have some veracity, it must be noted that the reported beneficial catalytic effects are yet to be 
associated with a step change in the region’s density and quality of economic activity. As Amin & Thrift (1994) have pointed 
out, the thickening of local institutions is not in itself sufficient to trigger or sustain growth. The processes at work are 
considerably more subtle than that. In this sense, it is perhaps premature to make definitive declarations about the 
development of decisive forms of institutional thickness, or the existence of untraded interdependencies. However, careful 
tracking of the region’s economic progress in the coming decade is likely to prove highly instructive for theoreticians with an 
interest in institutional development. Concepts associated with the institutionalist paradigm have tended to emerge from 
analysis of established regions. Close interrogation of such ideas within a nascent region such as the West Coast, may offer 
the opportunity to re-evaluate their utility and meaning, which has been questioned by some academics (see Markusen 
2003).  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the conceptual underpinnings of terminology associated with contemporary 
forms of regional political economy. However, it is pertinent in this context to further debate triggered by the critiques of 
‘New Regionalist’ discourse. Specifically, questions have to be asked about the ability of such strategies to effect socio-
economic transformation, which is such an imperative in a nation with South Africa’s stark socio-economic disparities. The 
‘New Regionalism’ has presented a particularly persuasive narrative for diverse policy-makers in recent years, seemingly 
offering an alternative Third Way beyond Keynesian supply-led growth and neoliberal market-led growth. Critical reviews of 
the ‘New Regionalist’ approach targeted at the regional development experience in the developed world, present a number 
of salutary points that resonate within the South African context. Mainstream expositions emanating from proponents of 
‘New Regionalism’ focus almost exclusively upon beneficial outcomes quantified in terms of economic growth.  
 
Critics, however, argue that the socio-spatial impacts of such growth often lack genuine transformative outcomes. As 
O’Hearn (1999) and Lovering (1999) have pointed out, very different stories of the Irish ‘Celtic Tiger’ and the Welsh 
‘Intelligent Region’ can be told if one scratches beneath the veneer of triumphalist accounts of regional success. Even in 
such cases where some degree of economic success has clearly been attained, it is not hard to find places and people who 
have been bypassed. As Lovering points out, there exists a tendency to confuse ‘development in a region with the 
development of a region’. Such concerns resonate with the West Coast’s recent experiences of growth. The embryonic 
industrial cluster based around Saldanha Steel has brought investment of more than US$1 billion to the area, yet the 
beneficial impacts upon the locality to date are at best questionable (Budlender & Shapiro 2001; Cochrane 1999; Fitschen 
1998). Few downstream multipliers have been generated and total full-time employment within the cluster is relatively low. 
Significant employment has been created and entrepreneurship stimulated through the outsourcing of on-site services, but 
the insecurity of contracts and low remuneration rates are a source of local controversy (Bek & Taylor 2001). When these 
factors are considered in the context of the socio-economic legacies of apartheid, it becomes clear that transformation 
processes are hardly being fast-tracked. Members of previously disadvantaged communities are for the most part involved 
in low paid, unskilled and semi-skilled positions. Such accounts are hardly atypical in the contemporary flexible global 
economy. However, the historical factors that delineate the present division of labour in South Africa are primarily the legacy 
of apartheid.  
 
The tourism industry, which is perceived as a major potential contributor to economic growth in the region, is equally open to 
critical interrogation. While the West Coast clearly has potential for substantial increases in visitor inflows, tough questions 
have to be asked about how links may be made between increased tourism and reductions in socio-economic disparities. At 
present, the local tourism industry rests almost exclusively in the hands of the White population, who possess the necessary 
social and financial capital to succeed. Creating meaningful opportunities for the previously disadvantaged is proving to be 
very difficult. Tourism the world over is associated with marked class-based disparities between elites and the service class, 
and the enduring nature of poverty in many of the world’s major tourist destinations is hardly encouraging. The structural 
character of such phenomena is a real concern, and questions have to be raised in terms of how meaningful opportunities 
may be created for disadvantaged individuals and communities. Signals from the West Coast to date are mixed. For 
example, despite large injections of state funds and human resources, it is proving difficult to disseminate significant 
benefits to the local people in the coastal village of Paternoster where rocketing real estate values are engendering greater 
alienation and disaffection.  
 
These are salutary thoughts that must be taken on board by policy-makers and their advisers if South Africa is to take 
significant strides in overcoming its remarkable levels of socio-economic disparity. Although highly creditable levels of 
macroeconomic stability have been attained within South Africa, the reality is that economic growth has remained restricted 
throughout the first decade of democracy, with growth rates that are rather sluggish when compared to other emerging 
nations[2]. For many observers, such problems are hardly surprising in the context of South Africa’s strict adherence to 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and the concomitant belief that the imposition of the correct macroeconomic fundamentals 
will be sufficient to trigger sustained growth and socio-economic upliftment (Bond 2000; Lester et al. 2000). The problems 
faced by the SDI programme in attracting and sustaining investment flows have been indicative of the flaws of such an 
approach. Even in cases such as the West Coast, where SDI methodology has been broadened to consider the institutional 
environment, a series of constraints remain, both in terms of triggering significant growth and in effecting socio-economic 
transformation.  
 
Lovering (1999) has shown that policies based on the tenets of the ‘New Regionalism’ are in reality consistent with the 
neoliberal paradigm, and as such are relatively unlikely to be successful as prescriptions for sustained growth and socio-
economic transformation. Some observers have expressed concern that South African planners and policy-makers have 
thus far been overly susceptible to the overtures of ‘New Regionalist’ boosterism and have tended not to cast a critical eye 
over the offerings of international consultants. However, the ANC Government faces a growing imperative to effect socio-
economic upliftment for the majority of the nation’s population. As one informant observed, the first decade of South African 
democracy witnessed a remarkable legislative and political transformation, the logical next step is to effect economic 
transformation and this will be the true test of the ANC government. Legislation designed to promote Black economic 
empowerment in various forms is continually being refined and implemented by national government and there is no 
doubting the rhetorical commitment of many politicians and officials to the process of transformation. As we have seen in 
South Africa’s West Coast region, genuine efforts to draw SDI actors into developing institutional networks are being made 
by state and non-governmental agencies. The key questions seem to be, whether these efforts can be translated into 
something meaningful in socio-economic terms, and, if this is successful, what does this actually tell us about strategies for 
implementing regional growth strategies in South Africa and elsewhere?  
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Notes  
 
[1]. The information presented here is based upon three phases of fieldwork conducted in the Western Cape. The first visit 
occurred between August 2000 and April 2001, the second in March/April 2004, the third in June/July 2004. Key primary 
sources included national, provincial and local government representatives and officials, individuals within corporations, 
small businesses, parastatals, NGOs, CBOs, consultants, and academics. In light of the politically and commercially 
sensitive nature of the information conveyed it has been decided to protect the identity of respondents.   
 
[2]. According to an Economist survey, South Africa ranked 22 out of 25 emerging nations in terms of GDP growth during 
2003/4 ( The Economist 29 May 2004, p. 102). 
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